“Family” ownership, tunneling and earnings management: A review of the literature by Bhaumik, Sumon & Gregoriou, Andros
 
  
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Family” ownership, tunneling and earnings management: 
A review of the literature  
 
 
 
 
By: Sumon Bhaumik and Andros Gregoriou     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 954 
March 2009   1 
“Family” ownership, tunnelling and earnings management: 
A review of the literature
* 
 
 
 
Sumon Kumar Bhaumik
** 
Brunel University, 
IZA – Bonn, and 
William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
 
Andros Gregoriou 
University of East Anglia 
 
 
Abstract 
In  this  review  article,  we  bring  together  a  number  of  aspects  of  family  firms  that  are 
ubiquitous in a number of institutional contexts, often as part of larger business groups. We 
pay particular attention to the mechanisms by which families retain control over firms, and 
the  incentives  of  the  families  in  control  to  expropriate  other  stakeholders  by  way  of 
tunnelling.  We  examine  the  role  of  earnings  management  in  facilitating  tunnelling,  and 
evidence about the incidence of earnings management in family firms. Our review suggests 
that while the literature on these aspects of family control is rich, the contexts in which the 
empirical  exercises  are  undertaken  are  relatively  few,  and  hence  there  is  considerable 
opportunity  to  expand  it  to  other  contexts,  in  particular  in  the  form  of  cross-country 
comparisons of the relative impact of agency conflicts and institutions on these issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Following the publication of the seminal paper of Jensen and Meckling (1976), it has become 
stylised to view operations of firms through the prism of agency conflicts. Indeed, there are 
now a large number of papers that examine different aspects of the agency conflict between 
owners and managers of firms with dispersed ownership, e.g., impact of this agency conflict 
on firm performance and managerial decisions about use of free cash flows (see Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). The focus on this particular type of agency conflict is not surprising, given 
that the empirical basis for this literature was widely held firms in the Anglo-Saxon world, in 
particular, in the United States. 
  However, researchers have now accepted the view that widely-held firms might be a 
minority in the corporate world, especially if we take into consideration organisational forms 
in  continental  Europe  and  the  developing  world.  A  large  number  of  firms  are  actually 
controlled  by  families,  either  through  direct  control  of  shares  or  through  indirect  control 
mechanisms like pyramidal structures. In India, for example, about 70 percent of the firms are 
family-controlled (Piramal, 1996). Even in the United States, about a third of the Standard 
and Poor‟s 500 companies are family owned, and the families account for 11 percent of these 
firms‟ cash flow rights and 18 percent of their voting rights. (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan, 
2007; Villalonga and Amit, 2007). 
  Family-ownership of firms eliminates the agency conflict between the managers and 
the owners. Across countries, family members account for a large proportion of the CEOs and 
Chairmen in family-controlled firms, and almost all such firms have significant representation 
of the family on their boards. The separation between management and ownership of the 
firms, the basis of what we shall call Type 1 agency conflict, is therefore weak. However, 
these firms are noted for another type of agency conflict – one we shall call Type 2, that 
between the controlling shareholders (or families) and the minority shareholders.  
The  replacement  of  one  type  of  agency  problem  with  another  has  important 
implications for family firms. Agency theory suggests that the elimination (or reduction) of 
Type 1 agency problems in family firms should enhance performance, and, as we discuss later   3 
in  this  paper, there is  evidence to suggest  that this  is  sometimes  the case.  However,  the 
positive impact of this convergence in the interests (and identity) of the (controlling) owners 
and managers may be outweighed by the negative impact of management entrenchment. The 
controlling  families  might  then  maximise  their  private  benefits,  at  the  expense  of  other 
shareholders. Specifically, there is evidence of expropriation of non-family shareholders by 
the  families  who  control  these  firms,  especially  where  the  voting  rights  of  the  families 
significantly exceeds their cash flow rights (e.g., Bertrand, Mullainathan and Mehta, 2002; 
Gao  and  Kling,  2007).  The  extent  of  this  expropriation  –  popularly  called  “tunnelling” 
(Johnson et al., 2000) – is especially high in countries that have weak legislative protection of 
the rights of the minority shareholders. 
It is now understood that tunnelling can take the form of expropriation of cash flows, 
or assets, or equity, or a combination of two or more of these firm attributes (Atanasov, Black 
and  Ciccotello,  2008).  Expropriation  of  cash  has implications  for  the  earnings  statement, 
while expropriation of assets and equity has implications for the balance sheet. In the long 
run, both forms of expropriation results in loss of earnings for minority shareholders, either 
directly or by way of loss of productive assets. Any perception of expropriation can, in turn, 
reduce  outside  investment  in  these  firms  and,  hence,  reduce  the  opportunities  of 
expropriation. All this has implications for earnings management by firms. Indeed, there is 
evidence to suggest that the likelihood of earnings management is greater among firms in 
which ownership is concentrated in the hands of blockholders like families (Fan and Wong, 
2002). 
In the rest of this review article, we shall examine the nature of family firms, the 
incentives for expropriation, and the ways in which earnings can be managed. Specifically, in 
Section 2, we examine the nature of family firms and the incentives of the controlling families 
to expropriate (current and future) earnings. In Section 3, we discuss the phenomenon of 
tunnelling, and its likely impact on market valuation of a firm. In Section 4, we discuss 
aspects  of  earnings  management.  Finally,  in  Section  5,  we  draw  conclusions  from  the 
literature discussed in the rest of the paper.   4 
2. Family Firms 
Social scientists have discussed a number of reasons that can explain the existence of family 
firms, especially in developing countries. Economists argue that existence of family firms is a 
consequence of imperfections in the market for managerial talent or a market for corporate 
control (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003). In the absence of a market for managerial 
talent, for example, firms may have to depend on successive generations of the founding 
families to provide managerial personnel. Similarly, if there is no market for takeovers, such 
that it is difficult to credibly threaten the management of poorly performing companies with 
the prospect of a takeover, the convergence of management and ownership could be a (second 
best) response aimed at ameliorating the Type 1 agency problem. The latter argument has 
been  extended  to  argue  that  family  ownership  of  firms  is  an  optimal  outcome  in 
circumstances where the cost of contract enforcement is high, such that informal agreements 
or social norms backed by the threat of social sanctions are used to facilitate transaction or 
resources and output, thereby explaining the ubiquity of family firms in China (Redding, 
1990; Peng and Heath, 1996). The role of trust among family members in mitigating Type 1 
agency problems, in particular, has been examined by management scholars (Yeung, 2006). 
  Alternative to the market imperfections argument suggest that family firms might be 
an outcome of factors such as altruism, externalities associated with social capital, and high 
cost of contract enforceability. Reciprocal altruism among family members could reduce their 
reservation price for key resources, thereby allowing them to outbid (or undercut) non-family 
firms in the product market (Eaton, Yuan and Wu, 2002). Similarly, while a firm can prosper 
with  addition  to  its  social  capital,  it  may  not  acquire  this  social  capital  from  a  widely 
dispersed group of individuals because the private benefits of  these individuals would be 
much less than the aggregate social capital of the firm. If the firm is owned by a family, 
however, it can acquire the social capital of the family, an institution that heavily invests in 
social capital (Arregle et al., 2007). 
Family firms are often members of wider business networks (Ghemawat and Khanna, 
1998; Peng and Delios, 2006), and the “market imperfection” view of family firms can be   5 
extended to explain this phenomenon (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). For example, if capital 
markets are imperfect, internal accruals of firms may be the dominant source of funds for 
investment. In such cases, existing firms with internal accruals are in a better position to start 
new business ventures (Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008), resulting in the formation of business 
groups  that  use  internal  capital  markets  to  mitigate  the  problems  associated  with  capital 
market imperfections. It has been demonstrated that membership of business groups might 
also act as a signal that makes it easier to access external funds (Ghatak and Kali, 2001; 
Lesnik, van der Molen and Gangopadhyay, 2003). Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
argue that propping is used as de facto collateral by group-firms, to ensure credit flows into a 
weak member of the group, in environments where the cost of enforcing debt covenants can 
be high. They cite the example of Lee Kun Hee, the head of the family that controls the 
Samsung Group, who used his personal wealth to pay off the debts of Samsung Motors Inc. 
Finally, in contexts where family businesses are the optimal organisational form, given factor 
market imperfections and costs of contract enforcement, among other things, the existence of 
family-affiliated business groups can perhaps also be explained by the economies of scope 
associated  with  intangible  and  tangible  resources  such  as  knowledge  of  the  business 
environment and distribution channels that are disproportionately concentrated in existing 
firms (Guillen, 2000). 
  Once a family firm comes into existence, retaining control of it may be the optimum 
strategy for the family if the legal institutions supporting contract enforcement is weak such 
that  retaining  control  is  the  only  certain  way  of  retaining  control  over  cash  flow  rights 
(Bertrand et al., 2008). Further, three different benefits accrue to the family if it preserves 
control. First, the family may derive non-pecuniary utility from the control over the firm, e.g., 
the ability to pass the firm over to subsequent generations, or the ability to sponsor a favourite 
sporting event. Second, a long-established family “name” might signal quality, access to the 
corridors of power etc – e.g., Reliance or Tata in India, such that the value of the firm might 
decline if the family in question no longer retains control over the firm. In other words, the 
value of its share of the firm might be higher for the family if it holds on to control than if it   6 
attempts to liquidate its share of the firm. Third, control might give the family the ability to 
appropriate a disproportionate share of the firm‟s current and future cash flows, at the expense 
of the minority shareholders (Johnson et al., 2000). Hence, a family relinquishes control over 
a firm to professional management only when the change in control significantly adds to the 
firm‟s profitability and, perhaps more importantly, when the private benefits – also known as 
amenity potential – accruing to the family on account of the control is low  (Burkart, Panunzi 
and Shleifer, 2003). Further, given that appropriation of a firm‟s cash flows is facilitated by 
group  affiliation,  when  all  the  group  firms  are  controlled  by  the  same  family  (Bebchuk, 
Kraakman and Triantis, 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006), family firms have a strong 
incentive to establish a group network to which all firms under their control are affiliated, 
which is consistent with the aforementioned correlation between family control and affiliation 
with business groups.  
  The literature has identified a number of ways in which families retain control over 
firms.  
  One of the most effective ways to control a firm without contributing the majority of 
its capital is to issue dual class shares whereby the shares sold to outside investors are 
bundled with significantly reduced voting rights (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). 
Holmen  and  Hogfeldt  (2005)  cite  the  case  of  Ericsson  in  which  the  Wallenberg 
family  controls  40  percent  of  the  voting  rights  even  though  they  contribute  to  1 
percent of the firm‟s capital. However, while issuing dual class shares is easy and is 
popular in some countries like South Africa and Sweden, it is not the most common 
mechanism  used  by  families  to  retain  control  (La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  and 
Shleifer, 1999).  
  The second, and often discussed, way of retaining control of firm involves the use of 
pyramids. For example, if a family owns 51 percent of the shares of Company A, and 
Company A owns 51 percent of the shares of Company B, then the family effectively 
controls Company B even though its “owns” about 25 percent of this company. In   7 
general, for any pyramid structure involving n  2 firms, where a family has control 
of Firm 1 by way of ownership of s1 proportion of its equity, Firm 1 has control of 
Firm 2 by way of ownership of s2 proportion of Firm 2‟s equity etc., where all 0 < si < 
1,  the family controls the nth firm by owing si proportion of its equity that could be 
arbitrarily small.  Pyramids are widely used for retention of control, not only in East 
Asia but also in Europe (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Claessens, 
Djankov  and  Lang,  2000;  Holmen  and  Hogfeldt,  2005).  However,  they  are  not 
common in countries like the United States and United Kingdom where regulations 
that require owners of some critical threshold of shares to mandatorily bid for the 
other shares of the company (Franks, Meyer and Rossi, 2005).  
  Finally,  families  can  use  cross-holdings  to  reinforce  their  control  over  groups  of 
companies. For example, if Company  C and Company D own  h percent of each 
others shares, and if a family directly owns s percent of the shares of each of these 
companies, then the family will have effective control over both these companies so 
long as (s + h) exceeds 50 percent (Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000). Cross-
holdings are commonly used by Asian business families, presumably because they 
reduce the transparency of the ownership structure of the companies (Weidenbaum, 
1996).  
It is easy to see that, for any given firms, all these three methods of retention of 
control  leads  to  a  divergence  between  the  control  rights  and  the  cash  flow  rights  of  the 
families (for details, see Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis, 2000). Claessens et al. (1998) 
suggest a way to measure this divergence, a methodology that has now become stylized. 
Suppose that a family controls x percent of Firm A‟s shares while Firm A, in turn, controls y 
percent of Firm B‟s shares. They argue that the family controls p percent of Firm B‟s shares 
when p = min(x, y), and q percent of Firm B‟s cash flows, when q = x  y. For example, in 
Thailand, at the time of their analysis, the Leophairatanas group controlled 16 percent of 
National Petrochemical which, in turn, controlled 44 percent of Asian Dragon Oil Refinery.   8 
Claessens et al. (1998) proposed that therefore the Leophairatanas group controlled 16 percent 
of Asian Dragon Oil Refinery but only about 6 percent of the firm‟s cash flows.  
  How  does  family  ownership  (or  control)  of  firms  affect  their  performance?  In 
principle,  at  least,  the  amelioration  of  Type  1  agency  problems  in  these  firms,  with  the 
controlling  family  caring  more  about  long  term  value  than  professional  management  and 
dispersed  shareholders,  might  dominate,  and  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  in  many 
contexts this is indeed the case. In a much cited paper, Anderson and Deeb (2003) estimate 
the following regression model: 
  Firm performance = 0 + 1(Family firm) + ’X + ’I + ’Y + u    (1) 
when firm performance is measured using returns on assets and Tobin‟s  q; X is a set of 
control variables; I is a vector of industry dummies; Y is a vector of year (or time) dummies; 
and u is the iid error term. They find that family firms outperform non-family firms, 
especially when they have family members as CEOs. Similarly, Maury (2006) found 
that, in a sample of 1672 West European non-financial firms, the valuation and profitability of 
family  firms  were,  on  average,  7  percent  and  16  percent  higher  than  their  non-family 
counterparts.  Using  data  on  275  German  listed companies,  Andres (2008) concludes that 
family controlled firms are more profitable than both widely held firms and firms with other 
types of blockholders. These results, however, come with caveats. Performance of family 
firms is usually better than their non-family counterparts only if the founding family member 
is still in control (Andres, 2008), perhaps as a consequence of a significant increase in Type 2 
agency conflict (especially relative to managerial skills) in family firms controlled by the 
descendents of the founding family member (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Also, valuation 
gains disappear in environments where protection of minority shareholders is weak. 
  Note,  however,  that  the  loss  of  valuation  gains  is  possibly  less  associated  with 
ownership  concentration  in  the  hands  of  the  families  itself  than  with  mechanisms  that 
entrench family control by wedging a gap between control and cash flow rights. Indeed, the   9 
impact of ownership concentration on firm performance is ambiguous. In an oft cited study, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) estimate the following regression model: 
  Q = 0 + 1BOARD0to5 + 2BOARD5to25 + 3BOARDgt25 + ’Z + e   (2) 
when Q = Tobin‟s q of a firm – the ratio of its market value to the replacement cost of its 
assets; BOARD0to5 equals actual ownership of shares by board members if it is less than 5 
percent of total, and 0.05 if this ownership exceeds 5 percent; BOARD5to25 equals zero if 
actual  ownership  of  shares  by  board  members  is  less  than  5  percent  of  total,  the  actual 
ownership of shares less 0.05 if this ownership is between 5 percent and 25 percent, and 0.25 
if ownership exceeds 25 percent; BOARDgt25 equals zero if actual ownership of shares by 
board  members  is  less  than  25  percent,  and  the  actual  ownership  of  shares  less  0.25  if 
ownership exceeds 25 percent; Z is a vector of control variables; and e is the iid error term. 
They find that 1 > 0, 2 < 0 and 3 > 0 (albeit weakly). Contrary to popular perception, they 
were reluctant to view this as evidence suggesting that concentration of ownership in the 
hands of insiders like family members initially enhances a firm‟s value but this value declines 
once the family (or insiders, in general) become entrenched. More recent research suggests 
that ownership concentration that aligns the long-term interests of the owners and the firms is 
performance enhancing, perhaps increasing and concave (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000), even 
though  the  impact  may  not  be  unambiguously  positive  in  contexts  where  corporate 
governance institutions are weak (Filatotchev, Lien and Piesse, 2005). 
However, a corporate governance problem unambiguously emerges when control co-
exists with divergence between the control rights and cash flow rights of the family. Lemmon 
and Lims (2003) use post-1997 data from eight East Asian crisis to demonstrate that the 
market valuation is 10-20 percent lower for firms in which managers have high level of 
control rights and where there is significant divergence between their control and cash flow 
rights. Similarly, King and Santor (2008) find that Canadian family firms that issue dual class 
shares have 17 percent lower market valuations than their non-family counterparts, despite 
having similar profitability and leverage. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2004) find that in the   10 
United States the value of an average firm is increasing and concave in the cash flow rights of 
the entrenched managers and this value is decreasing and convex in their control rights. They 
conclude  that  control  rights  sans  cash  flow  rights  results  in  underinvestment,  thereby 
concurring with Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) who demonstrate that in such cases 
investment  decisions  can  be  inefficient.  An  additional  source  of  problem  for  firms  with 
divergence between cash flow and control rights is the enhanced likelihood of expropriation, 
facilitated by decisions that are not performance enhancing for these firms. We shall discuss 
this issue in more detail in the next section. 
As  in  the  case  of  family  firms,  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  affiliation  with 
business groups might add a to a firm‟s performance and market value, especially in contexts 
where markets for capital and other factors of production are imperfect (Khanna, 2000a). 
Keister (1998) found that group affiliation improved productivity and financial performance 
among  Chinese  firms  in  the  eighties.  Perotti  and  Gelfer  (2001)  conclude  that  Russian 
industrial groups allocated capital more efficiently among member firms than external capital 
markets, resulting in high Tobin‟s q than comparable unaffiliated firms. These results are 
consistent with those of the multi-country studies of Khanna and Rivkin (1999). A study of 
Indian business groups by Khanna and Palepu (1999) indicates that the benefits of group 
affiliation might be higher if the group is well-diversified, with the benefits kicking in only 
after some threshold level of diversification has been reached. This contrasts sharply with 
early  evidence  from  the  United  States  which  find  that  membership  of  diversified  groups 
destroys firm value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). However, the view about 
the detrimental impact of diversification on firm value has now been brought into question in 
the United States context as well (Graham, Lemmon and Wolf, 2002). As in the case of 
family firms, the results about the positive impact of group affiliation on performance too 
come with a caveat. The cushion that group affiliation provides against credit rationing and 
investor  action,  increases  moral  hazard,  with  adverse  implication  for  firm  performance. 
Chacar and Vissa (2005) find that Indian firms with group affiliation have greater persistence 
of poor performance than those without group affiliation.   11 
In  sum,  the  literature  on  family  control  of  firms  has  examined  a  number  of 
hypotheses, the most important of which are as follows: 
H1.  Family firms are more likely to exist in environments where institutions, including 
those that protect the interests of minority shareholders, are weak, and where markets 
for key resources like credit are (at least partly) missing. 
H1a.  Family firms would have a high incidence of business group affiliation. 
H2.  Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights are much more likely to be 
observed in family-controlled firms than in their non-family counterparts. 
H3.  Family firms in which the founding family members play key management roles will 
outperform non-family firms, but the latter, in turn, would outperform legacy family 
firms where control is an outcome of succession. 
H4a.  Firms affiliated with business groups would outperform non-group affiliated firms in 
general, but group affiliation may foster moral hazard that would make it difficult for 
the former to rapidly adjust to difficult economic circumstances. 
The current consensus is that family firms often come into existence as a consequence 
of  market  imperfections  and  high  costs  of  contract  enforcement,  especially  in  emerging 
markets. Market imperfections and economies of scope involving intangible resources also 
explain why most family firms are part of wider business networks or business groups. The 
empirical evidence about the impact of family control or affiliation to business groups on 
performance is mixed; even though control in the hands of the founding members is likely to 
be more beneficial to a company than control in the hands of their successors. Evidence about 
the  impact  of  group-affiliation  on  firm  performance  is  less  ambiguous;  group-affiliation 
improves  performance  even  though  it  might  extend  efficiency-reducing  soft  budget 
constraints to weak firms in the group. However, perhaps the most important conclusion that 
we can draw on the basis of the discussion in this section of the paper is that once a family 
firm  comes  into  existence,  the  family  derives  a  number  of  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary 
benefits from the firm such that it is in their interest to retain control, and that retention of   12 
control  often  involves  a  divergence  between  cash  flow  rights  and  control  rights  of  the 
companies. We discuss the implications of this phenomenon in the next section.  
 
3. Tunnelling 
To recapitulate, family firms are known to use three different methods to retain control over 
companies – issue of dual class shares, pyramids, and cross-holdings – each of which leads to 
a  divergence  between  the  cash  flow  rights  and  the  control  rights  of  these  families.  For 
example, the Wallenberg family has rights over only 1 percent of the cash flows of Ericsson, 
but has 40 percent of the voting rights. This divergence reduces the incentive of a family to 
distribute the company‟s free cash flows to the shareholders, given that it will receive a small 
share of this cash flow. Instead, the family has a strong incentive to use the free cash flows in 
ways that maximise its own private benefits. Indeed, in the empirical literature on ownership, 
family control is used as a proxy for existence of private benefits (Franks and Meyer, 2001). 
Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003) cite the case of Hohner AG, a German firm owned by the Hohner 
family, which spent DM 11.6 million on social and philanthropic donations between 1949 and 
1961. By contrast, the shareholders received DM 7.2 million in dividend payments. The value 
of  such  private  benefits  can  be  high,  as  much  as  half  (South  Korea)  or  even  two-thirds 
(Brazil) of a firm‟s market value (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
  A more common occurrence, perhaps, is tunnelling, whereby the controlling entity – 
a family, in many cases – uses a variety of means to transfer a significant proportion of the 
free cash flows from a company in which they have small cash flow rights and yet large 
voting rights, into a company in which they have large cash flow rights and control (Johnson 
et al., 2000). It is now known, for example, that the Tanzi family that controlled the Paramalat 
group tunnelled out at least USD 3 billion from the group companies into other companies 
that were directly owned by the family (Enriques and Volpin, 2007).  This amount accounted 
for a sixth of the group‟s use of financial resources between 1990 and 2003, and 30 percent of 
the group‟s debt. The transfer of resources was made largely by way of overpayment for 
acquisition of assets, and the family used others means like hiding losses and understanding   13 
debt on their financial statements to cover up the fraud. Evidence of tunnelling by family and 
other large blockholders has been found in a number of contexts: Bulgaria (Atanasov, 2005); 
China  (Gao  and  Kling,  2007);  Hong  Kong  (Cheung,  Rao  and  Stouraitis,  2006);  India 
(Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002); Japan (Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998); Russia and 
the United States (Atanasov et al., 2006); South Korea (Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002; Baek, 
Kang and Lee, 2006); and Sweden (Bergstrom and Rydqvist, 1990). There are some studies 
that argue that there is no clear evidence of tunnelling among family firms, even when they 
are affiliated to groups like the chaebols (e.g., Chang and Shin, 2007), but the dominant view, 
by far, is that tunnelling, and the associated expropriation of non-family shareholders, is fairly 
widespread. 
It is now understood that tunnelling can take the form of expropriation of cash flows, 
or assets, or equity, or a combination of two or more of these firm attributes (Atanasov, Black 
and Ciccotello, 2008). Examples of cash flow tunnelling includes sale of a firm‟s output at 
below-market prices to another firm in which the family (or blockholder) has significant or 
complete cash flow rights, or over-payment for inputs purchased from such firms. Cash flow 
tunnelling  may  also  result  in  excessive  salaries  or  perquisites  for  family  members  (or 
insiders). Expropriation of cash has implications for the earnings statement, but does not 
necessarily  affect  a  firm‟s  long-term  productivity.  Asset  tunnelling  typically  involves  the 
transfer  of  a  firm‟s  assets  to  companies  (usually)  fully  owned  by  the  families  (or 
blockholders) and it can significantly affect a firm‟s long-term ability to generate cash flows. 
Equity tunnelling involves actions that benefit the families (or blockholders) at the expense of 
a reduction in the value of the shares owned by the other investors; e.g., sale of new shares to 
the families at a below-market price, delisting and taking a firm private, and the issue of loans 
to  the  families that  would  not  have  to be  repaid  if  the  associated  business  venture  were 
unsuccessful. All these forms of tunnelling have been witnessed in a number of contexts, but 
perhaps nowhere more frequently than in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, especially in the former Soviet republics, in the aftermath of the privatisation of their   14 
companies (see Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000; Atanassov, 2005; Atanasov, Black 
and Ciccotello, 2008). 
Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (2008) neatly summarize the impact of tunnelling on 
share value. They assume that tunnelling is stealing such that, unlike in the case of (say) 
transfer pricing, there is zero cash flow accruing to the firm from which cash flow or assets 
are being tunnelled. In the absence of tunnelling, the value of each share is given by 
K
A ROA
V NT

                 (3) 
when ROA is the return on assets, A is the stock of assets, and K is the cost of capital. If now, 
a proportion  of the cash flow is tunnelled away, the value of each share would be 
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If, however,  proportion of the assets itself is tunnelled away, and if this act reduces the 
returns to the assets by  percent, then the value of each share would be 
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            (5) 
Since the actual act of tunnelling is difficult to witness or identify, evidence about 
existence of tunnelling is necessarily indirect. Bertrand, Mullainathan and Mehta (2002), for 
example, demonstrate that returns to assets of group-affiliated business firms under-responds 
to industry-wide shocks. They interpret this result as the manifestation of tunnelling of profits 
from  more  profitable  firms  within  business  groups  to  less  profitable  ones ,  often  using 
miscellaneous and non-recurring gains and losses. By contrast, Baek, Kang and Lee (2006) 
draw  conclusions  about  tunnelling  in  South  Korean chaebols  from  investor  reaction.  For 
example, if a firm issues equity, the announcement returns to the issuer would be negative if 
the newly issued equity is sold to another firm within the same business group – an act that is 
consistent with tunnelling – or if they are sold to the controlling shareholders of the issuing 
firm at a (perceived) discount. This approach is consistent with the research of Bae, Kang and   15 
Kim (2002) who find that share price of South Korean firms fall if they are required to bail 
out or acquire a failing firm in the same business group. 
It has been argued that investors anticipate the likelihood of one or more of these 
forms of tunnelling in firms that have significant divergence between voting and cash flow 
rights and those that are closely affiliated to groups (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2000). Recall, 
for example, the caveat regarding family control and firm performance mentioned earlier in 
this paper, namely, that while family control may enhance a firm‟s profitability, it adversely 
impacts the  firm‟s  valuation  Claessens  et  al. (2002)  found  that,  in  East  Asia,  divergence 
between cash flow rights and voting rights of families have a negative impact on the Tobin‟s 
q of the firms. They estimated that a 10 percentage point divergence between cash flow and 
voting rights triggered a 6 percentage points discount in the market valuation of a firm. In the 
same vein, Khanna and Palepu (2000b) found that foreign institutional investors were more 
likely to invest in unaffiliated Indian companies than in firms with group-affiliation, which 
facilitates  tunnelling.  Gopalan,  Nanda  and  Seru  (2007)  found  that  Indian  investors  and 
creditors  are  aware  of  the  propensity  among  group-affiliated  firms  to  transfer  financial 
resources to other group companies that are inefficient and hence incapable of raising capital 
on their own, usually in the form of inter-corporate loans. As a consequence, bankruptcy of 
any of the group companies results in a significant reduction in access to investment and 
credit for all remaining firms in the group. However, other studies have failed to discover a 
priori discount of a firm‟s value in firms that have the potential to expropriate shareholders by 
way  of  one  or  more  form  of  tunnelling,  and  have  therefore  concluded  that  investors  are 
myopic  and  systematically  underestimate  the  risk  of  tunnelling  and  expropriation  (e.g., 
Cheung, Rau and Stouritis, 2006). Villalonga (2007) argues that the reaction of the market to 
tunnelling  potential  depends  on  the  mechanism  that  is  used  by  the  dominant  family  (or 
blockholder) to enhance control. 
Unsurprisingly, the corporate governance literature, one of whose focus is on investor 
protection,  views distribution  of  all  available free cash  flows  to  investors in the  form  of 
dividends. It is argued that this would remove the ability of managers or blockholders with   16 
disproportionate control over a company‟s resources to use discretion in the allocation of this 
cash flow, thereby eliminating (or minimising) the extent of private benefits. Indeed, in the 
Anglo-Saxon framework, dividends are viewed as a signal that agency conflicts within a firm 
have been ameliorated (Jensen, 1986; Faccio, Lang and Young, 2000). However, payout of 
significant dividends may not embody a panacea in so far as tunnelling is concerned. There is 
evidence to suggest that Chinese companies with concentrated ownership use dividends to 
attract new investors before issuing new shares, and the capital raised thereof might then be 
used in  ways  that are  consistent  with the  private  benefits  of the  controlling  shareholders 
(Chen, Jian and Xu, 2008). Note that, in any event, while dividend payouts can reduce or 
eliminate the extent of cash tunnelling, they cannot reduce asset or equity tunnelling to a 
significant  extent.  The  solution  to  this  form  of  failure  of  corporate  governance  might, 
therefore, lie in direct oversight involving independent and knowledgeable directors, high 
quality  auditors,  and  presence  of  blockholders  like  institutional  investors  who  have  the 
incentive and the ability to monitor the controlling family (Gao and Kling, 2007). 
In sum, the most important hypotheses examined in the literature on tunnelling are as 
follows: 
H5.  Tunnelling  is  more  likely  to  be  prevalent  in  firms  that  are  affiliated  to  business 
groups, even more so when there is significant divergence in the control and cash 
flow rights of the controlling shareholder. 
H6.  Investors punish perceived acts of tunnelling by driving down share prices of the 
relevant firms, and, in extreme circumstances, by not investing in these firms. 
H7.  Reaction of investors would be greater for perceived acts of asset tunnelling than for 
perceived acts of cash tunnelling. 
It is easy to see that a corollary of H6, a hypothesis that has thus far not been examined in 
detail, is that if tunnelling is wide spread in a certain context, the economy in question is 
much more likely to have a bank-based financial system than an equity-based system. 
Overall, there is significant evidence to suggest that families – more generally, main 
blockholders in companies in which there is a significant divergence between their voting   17 
rights and cash flow rights – can generate significant private benefits by expropriating the 
other shareholders. Such expropriation is more likely in contexts like the Central and East 
European  countries  in  transition,  where  investor  protection  is  weak.  Some  methods  of 
tunnelling or expropriation affects only the cash flow accruing to the non-family shareholders 
while others affect the long-term potential of the firm to generate cash flows. There is mixed 
evidence about the extent  to  which investors anticipate  tunnelling  and  expropriation,  and 
penalise  the  families  by  way  of  lower  market  valuation  of  their  firms.  Finally,  there  is 
evidence to suggest that payout of dividends might not be the panacea  to the problem of 
tunnelling. In the next section, we discuss the role of earnings management in the context of 
tunnelling. 
 
4. Earnings Management 
The accounting literature on earnings management sheds light on how earnings management 
is  undertaken,  using  appropriate  loopholes  in  accounting  standards.  The  loopholes  exist 
because, given that financial reports convey managers‟ information on the firms‟ performance 
(Financial Accounting Concepts Statement, No 5, 1984), accounting standards must permit 
managers to exercise judgement in financial reporting. This, in turn, is on account of the fact 
that we do not have an accounting system that is entirely rules based, offering no room for 
judgement; a rigid accounting system needs to provide rules for all circumstances, a near 
impossibility. In addition, new situations such as securitizations arise regularly, requiring new 
accounting rules to be devised, and the regulators might be able to respond only with a time 
lag. Therefore, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require that judgement be 
exercised in preparing financial statements. Managers can use their firm specific knowledge 
to select reporting methods and disclosures that increase the value of accounting as a form of 
communication. However, given that auditing is imperfect, managements‟ use of judgement 
also creates opportunities for “earnings management”, in which managers choose reporting 
methods and estimates that do accurately reflect their firms‟ underlying economics.     18 
There  are  three  alternative  definitions  of  earnings  management  in  the  accounting 
literature. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) describe earnings management as occurring when 
managers exercise their discretion over accounting numbers with or without restrictions. Such 
discretion can  be  either firm  value  maximizing  or  opportunistic.  Schipper  (1999)  defines 
earnings management as “implementation that impairs an element of decision usefulness or 
implementation that is inconsistent with the intent of the standard”. Healy and Wahlen (1999) 
define earnings  management  as  situations  when  managers  alter  financial reports  to  either 
mislead  shareholders  about  the  underlying  economic  performance  of  the  company  or  to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. Executives face 
a hierarchy of choices when they manage earnings (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999): 
report positive profit, report profit at least equal to profit from four quarters ago, and meet 
analysts‟ expectations. 
In  order  to  examine  whether  earnings  have  been  managed,  researchers  have  to 
measure the effects of managers‟ use of accounting discretion in unexpected accruals, i.e., 
estimates of unexpected accruals are deemed a proxy for the impact of managers‟ use of 
accounting discretion. To estimate unexpected accruals, most studies use the Jones (1991) 
model, where total accruals (TA) are defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus 
the  change  in  current  liabilities  excluding  the  current  portion  of  long  term  debt,  minus 
depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets. The Jones model is estimated 
cross-sectionally each year using the following ordinary least squares regression model:  
  1 1 2 3 1/ it it it it it TA Assets Sales PPE                   (6) 
Where  it Sales  represents the change in sales scaled by total assets,  1, it Assets   and  it PPE  is 
net property, plant and equipment scaled by  1. it Assets   Use of total assets as a deflator is 
intended to reduce the impact of heteroskedasticity on  . it   The residuals of equation (6),  it   
are the Jones model discretionary accruals.  
The fundamental problem with the Jones model is that it treats revenues as entirely 
non-discretionary. However, if earnings are managed by shifting revenues from future time   19 
periods, then the change in revenue would be endogenous to the model. In order to control for 
the endogeneity bias, Dechow et al. (1995) propose a modification to the Jones model in 
which  the  change  in  accounts  receivable  () it AR    is  subtracted  from  it Sales    prior  to 
estimating equation (6); see, among others, Guidry et al (1999) as an example. They assume 
that sales are not managed in the estimation period, but that the entire change in accounts 
receivable in the event year represents earnings management. Thus, Dechow et al. (1995) use 
the parameters from the Jones model estimated in the pre-event period for each firm in their 
sample, and apply those to a modified sales change variable define as   it it Sales AR   to 
compute discretionary accruals in the event period. Therefore, the modified Jones model is 
estimated in a time-series framework. The major drawback of this approach is that it is likely 
to create a large estimated discretionary accrual when a firm is experiencing excessive growth 
in the test period compared to the estimation period. Kothari. et al (2005) point out that this 
problem can be solved by not having a pre-event period, where it is assumed that changes in 
accounts  receivable  are  unmanaged. They  propose  that  the  modified  Jones  model  can  be 
estimated as if changes in accounts receivable arise from earnings management. That is, the 
modified  Jones  model  can  be  estimated  cross-sectionally  using  sales  changes  net  of  the 
change in accounts receivables (i.e.,  it it Sales AR    is used). 
Much  of  the  discussion  about  earnings  management  is  in  the context  of  Type  1 
agency problem. It is now stylised that executive compensation is a major motivation for 
earnings  management. Managerial compensation typically consists of a basic salary and a 
bonus, and the latter is typically tied to accounting performance measures such as earnings, 
return on assets and return on equities. Therefore, managers can influence their compensation 
by managing either accruals or real transactions as reported by Dye and Verrecchia (1995) 
and Evans and Sridhar (1996).  There are other incentives for managers to exercise discretion 
in  financial  reporting  as  well;  Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1986)  argue  that  higher  corporate 
earnings also result in higher share value which increases job security and wealth if managers 
are shareholders. Healy (1985) argues that managers use current discretionary accruals to   20 
maximize both this time period‟s bonus and the expected value of next period‟s bonus. When 
earnings are above or below last years earnings, managers shift income to future time periods 
to  maximize  multi-period  compensation.  Guidry  et  al.  (1999)  find  support  for  the  Healy 
(1985) hypothesis using internal data from different business units within a single company. 
Gaver  and  Gaver  (1998)  reaffirm  the  findings  of  Healy  (1985)  for  nonrecurring  items. 
However, Strong and Meyer (1987) and Elliot and Shaw (1988) contradict the findings of 
Healy  (1985),  by  stating  that  when  earnings  are  below  expectations  for  a  period,  some 
managers  might  write-off  as  many  costs  as  possible  in  that  period  with  the  intention  of 
claiming they are „clearing the desks‟ to facilitate improved future performance. If this is the 
case the incentive to manage earnings decreases dramatically. Jung and Kwon (2002) find 
that the informativeness of earnings reports increase with the concentration of shares in the 
hands of the controlling owners, suggesting that reduction of Type 1 agency conflict lies at 
the heart of the earnings management phenomenon. 
However, there is a growing literature on the relationship between Type 2 agency 
problem and earnings management, with a view that earnings management is more prevalent 
in firms with significant Type 2 agency conflict (Fan and Wong, 2002), and in contexts where 
quality of investor protection is low (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). Chen, Jian and Xu 
(2008),  for  example,  argue  that  some  Chinese  companies  find  it  in  their  interest  to  pay 
dividends, irrespective of their profitability, because it makes these firms attractive to outside 
investors, thereby facilitating tunnelling of the proceeds from seasoned offerings of shares. 
This view is consistent with that of Liu and Lu (2007) who argue that Type 2 agency conflict 
is the main reason behind earnings management in Chinese companies. Aharony, Wang and 
Yuan (2005) demonstrate that the vehicle used for earnings management is transactions with 
related  firms.  In  an  ideal  world  with  rational  investors,  such  strategies  should  not  offer 
sustained opportunities for expropriation. However, Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006) find 
that,  in  Hong  Kong,  the outside investors  (i.e., the  “market”)  do not impose  an  a  priori 
penalty on the firms, suggesting that investors might be myopic.   21 
Such behaviour on the part of the family or other blockholders is entirely consistent 
with the evidence highlighted in the wider literature. Healy and Palepu (2003) demonstrate 
how, “[d]espite this elaborate corporate governance network, Enron was able to attract large 
sums of capital to fund a questionable business model, conceal its true performance through a 
series of accounting and financing maneuvers, and hype its stock to unsustainable levels” [pp. 
4]. Similarly, Gordon and Henry (2005) find evidence to suggest in the United States absolute 
adjusted abnormal accruals, a proxy for earnings management, is positively correlated with 
certain related party transactions. Several other studies seek evidence on whether earnings 
management  influences  share  price.  Perry  and  Williams  (1994)  consider  earnings 
manipulation in the year preceding the public announcement of a management buyout and 
find evidence, that management manipulates discretionary accruals to understate earnings, in 
the hope of decreasing the share price. Kasznik (1999) finds that managers who issue earnings 
forecasts  manage  reported  earnings  towards  their  forecasts.  He  reports  that  firms  with 
managers  that  overestimated  earnings  have  significant  levels  of  positive  discretionary 
accruals. Tech et al. (1998) find that initial public offering (IPO) firms are more likely to have 
higher earnings in the (IPO) year relative to a matched sample of non IPO firms. In addition, 
studies of bank loan loss provisions (see, among others, Liu and Ryan, 1995; Liu et al., 1997) 
find  compelling  evidence  of  a  positive  association  between  share  prices  and  earnings 
management  amongst  banks.  Studies  of  property-causality  insurance  claim  loss  reserves, 
including Petroni (1992) and Penalva (1998) find evidence that earnings management among 
insurers causes a hike in the share price.  
  Evidently, evidence of earnings management can be found both in emerging market 
firms that are controlled by large shareholders, and in widely held firms in the Anglo-Saxon 
world. The difference lies in the motivation for earnings management, namely, tunnelling or 
investor  expropriation  in  the  former  and  executive  compensation  in  the  latter.  There  is 
evidence to suggest, however, that in firms experiencing Type 2 agency problems earnings 
management might actually be reduced when the controlling blockholder‟s share of the equity 
crosses some threshold, i.e, when there is significant convergence between cash flow rights   22 
and voting rights. Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007) “when the ownership concentration [in their 
sample  of  Chinese  firms]  reaches  a  high  level  [i.e.,  in  excess  of  55-60  percent],  large 
shareholders become the true owners of the firm, and are thus more likely to seek to preserve 
its future growth potential by minimising accounting earnings” [pp. 235]. This is consistent 
with the conclusion drawn by Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan (2007), namely, that family firms 
exhibit less discretionary accruals and that in these firms earnings components better predict 
cash flows. They also find that family firms are more likely to warn about likely negative 
shocks to the companies than their non-family counterparts. Wang (2006) and Hutton (2007) 
too conclude that the quality of disclosure in family firms is quite good.  
  In sum, there seems to be some consensus in the earnings management literature 
about the appropriate way to empirically model this phenomenon, namely, the   modified 
Jones model, perhaps with the modification suggested by Kothari et al. (2005). It should be 
noted, however, that while the use of both cross-sectional and panel data allow us to glean 
broad insights into the associated agency problems, they are fraught with problems. Earnings 
management  occurs  at  the  end  of  the  financial  year,  suggesting  that  the  manipulation  of 
accruals  takes  place  simultaneously  across  firms.  Firms  therefore  are  exposed  to  market 
shocks (risks) which generate volatility clustering across total accruals. Volatility clustering 
may  generate  significant  contemporaneous  correlations  across  these  companies  and 
dramatically reduces the efficiency of the panel estimates. 
Nevertheless, the literature on earnings management has rich implications for agency 
problems within firms, and the main hypotheses are as follows: 
H8.  In Anglo-Saxon firms with Type 1 agency conflicts, earnings management is largely 
on account of executive bonus, and current discretionary accruals is the main vehicle 
for earnings management in these companies. 
H8a.  In firms with Type 1 agency conflicts, earnings management is likely to be used to 
meet (or exceed) earnings targets/forecasts if true earnings are marginally short of 
these targets. If actual earnings fall far short of targets/forecasts, however, earnings   23 
management is likely to be used to “clear the desk” by transferring future costs to that 
year, and by transferring earnings to future years. 
H9.  In  family  controlled  firms  that  are  marked  by  Type  2  agency  conflicts,  earnings 
management is largely aimed at attracting capital from outside investors, and in these 
firms the main vehicle for earnings management is related party transactions. 
H9a.  In a family controlled firm, earnings management is more likely in a period leading 
up to an event such as an IPO. 
H9b.  As  a  family‟s  ownership  of  a  company‟s  shares  increases  such  that  there  is  a 
convergence  in  its  cash  flow  rights  and  control  rights,  the  extent  of  earnings 
management in the firm decreases. 
The  discussion  highlights  one  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  literature  on  earnings 
management, as it relates to family firms and the specific type of agency problem that they 
experience. Much of the empirical literature on earnings management in emerging markets 
firms  with  large  blockholders  is  in  the  context  of  China,  which  is  insightful  but  not 
necessarily generalisable. Yet, emerging markets, with weak institutions for oversight and 
insider protection, provide a perfect backdrop for both existence of family firms with complex 
group  affiliations  and  earnings  management.  Further  research  in  this  area,  extending  the 
empirical  literature  to  other  emerging  markets,  and  perhaps  also  to  non-Anglo-Saxon 
developed countries, is clearly warranted. 
 
5. Concluding Comments 
The literature on corporate governance is increasingly focusing on Type 2 agency problems, 
and a natural consequence of it is the attention being given to family controlled firms, many 
of which are part of larger business groups, especially in the emerging market economies. In 
this survey, we have examined the literature on a number of issues: why family firms are so 
commonly found in various business environments, why they may want to be part of larger 
business  groups,  the  impact  of  family  control  and  group  affiliation  on  performance  and 
valuation of firms, the mechanisms used by families to control firms, the consequences of   24 
divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights – the phenomenon of tunnelling, the 
nature of earnings management that can facilitate tunnelling, and the (non-linear) relationship 
between family/blockholder control and the quality of financial disclosure. The growing body 
of empirical literature is rich in evidence about many of these issues, and provides the basis 
for  an  interesting  narrative.  However,  much  of  the  evidence  comes  from  a  handful  of 
institutional  contexts,  namely,  China,  Germany,  India,  South  East  Asian  countries,  South 
Korea  and  the  United  States.  The  paucity  of  literature  on  Latin  American  counties,  in 
particular, is both surprising and unfortunate. Explicit cross-country comparisons that can 
help to draw conclusions about the impact of specific corporate governance and financial 
market institutions on factors like expropriation and earnings management, as also about the 
relative importance of (and interaction between) agency conflicts and institutional factors are 
also  conspicuous  by  their  paucity.  These  provide  significant  avenues  along  which  the 
literature on these very relevant and important corporate governance issues can be extended, 
and that should be the endeavour of future research. 
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